OK, I know I am becoming a grumpy old man. As my appointment with the ‘Grim Reaper’ gets closer the more things in corporate travel seem to rankle. For example my pet hate at present is the strap line used by ACTE to promote itself.
It seems the three key things that most attract new and current members are to ‘be smart, be hip and be seen’. Now I can go with the first one but I think there are a few other worthy aspirations slightly ahead of being ‘hip’ and ‘seen’. I mean what is all that about? But I digress!
My diatribe today is all about ‘the customer’ and what they truly want. Now this is not easy as, depending where you dip into the supply chain, you get a different definition of customer. It becomes clear that each definition of the customer is more linked to who we want them to be rather than who they really are.
If you go to an airline like say American they are likely to say the traveller. Go to an international corporation and they would say we, the company are. Go to a TMC and they will say either or both depending on who makes the decision to appoint us and who has the strength to get us sacked. Go to the GDS and they will say ‘we buy/sell segments from and to airlines and TMCs so we don’t need to know. However I think they do as the traveller is far more likely to book outside their service on direct websites.
Now let us assume for one moment that the traveller is the decision maker. In many cases this is fact. They may get influenced either strongly or weakly by their budget holding employers but hey, they can usually find a way around that. So what do they want? Simple you may think but I contend otherwise.
If you read the papers, magazines etc what everyone is interested in price. How do I get this cheap, who can give me the best price package, how can I get lower fares but better perks? The low cost carriers came along and thrived by undercutting the big established boys and the glory of cheapness became a reality. But hold on a minute, those low cost flights were on high density short haul routes and every time a transatlantic model was launched it failed. Does that say something?
It says to me that people are prepared to put up with most kinds of discomfort on little commuter routes but not when they are going any distance. Then the cabin gets cramped, the service poor and the food practically inedible. But despite all this the media and corporate hype is all about how all travel should be cheap and fares stripped down to their component parts.
The result is that although the truth of low fares is that they are in reality getting less available, the call for them is getting greater. It is also now on all routes not the one hour local shuttle service. So how do the mainstream airlines cope with this demand? They simply give the customer what they think they want in a base price but ‘nickel and dime’ the price up on ancillaries. Result? They are probably better off because they have also stripped out a load of service costs.
Unfortunately these extra services that have been removed out are the very things that differentiate them in the market place. They have also had a major impact on how they are perceived by ‘the traveller’. To me British Airways is a fine example of this although there are many more. BA has shed cost like a snake sheds skin. With all these customers supposedly wanting lower prices they either had to re-register as a charity or strip to the bone. They chose the latter and it is bearing dividends for them…in the short term, as the backlash is growing.
My mood was not improved last Sunday when I was reading the Sunday Times Colour Supplement. In it there was an article that was hugely critical of British Airways and its Heathrow hub. It self righteously condemned BA on everything from staff attitude to catering. I did not get a proper traditional English afternoon tea one interviewee bleated; another was depressed about meagre snacks and miserable staff.
Come on guys, you killed the airline BA was in order to create the one you say everyone wants.
BA simply charged too much for the modern world to stomach so what did they do?
They made themselves competitive by taking on the unions to reduce overheads, shed unprofitable routes, cut back on catering, and started charging for previously free services. And what do we do now they have become lean, mean and cheaper? We criticise them and mourn the demise of those dear little things we took for granted.
So is there a moral behind all this? I think there is. And the answer, in part was in the final paragraphs of that idiotic article. The piece listed all the things that passengers are supposed to want from an airline like BA (most were what BA used to do) and then it said on behalf of the traveller ‘We’ll pay – provided it’s good’ Wow!
So the traveller wants service after all? Maybe it is not universally about price? Could people really be prepared to ‘pay – provided it’s good? Your guess is as good as mine but in the meantime I suggest we could all take a good look at what we are turning this industry into and whether we are willing to pay to put part of it back together again – if it is good.
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Corpoate. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Corpoate. Tampilkan semua postingan
Kamis, 28 Juli 2011
Minggu, 23 Januari 2011
The Evolution of Air Distribution – The Story so Far
Now you are going to need to bear with me on this. Blogs are supposed to be brief and incisive but this one won’t. I just think that perhaps too many people assume that everyone knows about air distribution history and, by extension, fully understands the dynamics in play. I am not sure this is the case (why should they) so here is my understanding of how we got to where we are now.
It would take a book not a blog to go into the full detail and rationale so I will content myself and your patience by picking out the key players and change milestones in what will be a summary of what has happened and who are the movers and shakers. I think the customer needs to know the basics especially as they are ultimately paying unless they can do without at least one of the current cogs in the distribution mechanism.
Initially there was not much of an issue. The airlines worked in concert with each other and their supply chain and basically paid for everything required to distribute their product. They paid merchant fees to card companies, commission to agents (no such things as TMCs then) and fees to the GDS. Having picked up all these tabs they then sold their tickets with these costs built in to their fares. All of them did it so there was no problem Simple and reasonably effective in a well regulated, stable and growing travel market where little true competition existed.
As an example (and it varies hugely by area) airlines paid agents 10% commision and between 3 to 30% override, 1.5-3% card fees and 4% to 6% GDS charges.All of that bundled into the end ticket price.
Then things changed. Airlines expanded their route structures and became far more competitive with each other. The first sign of change was when ticket prices started to diversifyfrom airline to airline. In order to attract increasingly fickle travellers a fare differentiation was required. Carriers moved away from simply discounting their standardised global gross fare pricing and introduced corporate nets, yield managed specials and additional one-off deals.In one class alone you could end up with over a dozen fares each with their own restrictions and availability allocations.
The result was twofold. Firstly the ability to interchange tickets between airlines disappeared and secondly the need to mitigate pricing concessions made them look harder at their costs. Their distribution costs to be precise.
They found themselves in a real dilemma. The need to compete and discount was obviously threatening their profits (what there were) and simultaneously two other things happened. Low cost carriers with a totally different price model arrived who had to worry far less about convenience, timetables, airport locations and service which in turn encouraged corporations to view travel in a far more commoditised way. So, on one side they had to compete with carriers with a considerably lower cost base/tariff and on the other, a customer with a much harder stance towards price.
What became clear was that they could not continue paying the full cost of distributing their products whilst competing with new entrant pricing combined with more savvy buyers.Something had to give and what ‘gave’ was the air distribution model. After all, if you cannot beat the no frills airlines and professional buyers then the only option was to join them and challenge elsewhere in the travel merry-go- round.
I think their objectives were a mixture between the sound and the inevitable. The markets had clearly changed and if the end customer really wanted transparency and a lower cost model then give it to them. Whether they really wanted or needed it in the first place is a discussion for another day. Many of the arguments today are revolving around the desire for commoditisation coming head to head with the necessity for flexibility and uniformity of information and access.
There is another key influencing factor which is technology. Part of the reason why the main airlines feel both desirous and capable of change is that, for the first time there are other potential technology solutions out there. That is to say they are there if, and only if, the end users really do expect them to act individually rather than collectively with other provider’s inventory. Hence the current pressures on the GDS who provide all encompassing booking services and charge a high price for doing so. There is no way any individual airline can provide the diversity and product span that a GDS does.
The airlines (individually and at varying speeds) have called time on paying full distribution costs for all services to all customers. Unfortunately I do not see their goal as eradicating such costs. Their objective is to find what they see is the right home for these costs and then try to ensure the savings are not taken away by having to reduce prices to compensate the travellers, who will undoubtedly have to pay. Unless as I mentioned earlier a cog taken out of the distribution wheel. but which one?
So are there any expendable cogs? In some sectors of the market then probably yes. However, only if people recognise what they want and are prepared to accept the consequences and constraints of such. I think the line will be drawn between those corporations that want a controlled, managed and reported programme and others that choose a more deregulated approach where cheapest flights and few management ‘frills’ are acceptable.
If you want travel management you need knowledge and control. In order to do this you need someone to consolidate travel in all forms and package it into controllable chunks from as few sources as possible. At present this is best done through a GDS booking system, a travel management company and a mandated card programme. You take overall control of your travel, accept the price of doing so and form the right balance between value and all the other broader elements that complement your company ethos. Does anybody with a travel programme really want to run around numerous individual online airline sites and compare them when a GDS already does that in a one-stop environment?
On the other side if you want to maximise trip by trip savings there is no reason why approaching the cheapest distribution source and exploiting it until another one comes along is not the right way. To be frank the cheapest booking cost would be by going to an airline direct either independantly or through a TMC which is why carriers like American Airlines, Lufthansa etc are differentiating pricing and availability dependant on where the booking comes from. It does not by any means guarantee that overall trip price will be lower but the reservations element may be.
What I am begining to see happening is that airlines are finally differentiating between varying corporate needs and handling them individually. This part I applaud even though it has taken a long time and has a way to go. They are beginning to see the contrast between travel management and the very different service provided through Online Booking Agencies (OTAs) which, despite all the hype, focus on a different and smaller market that has a different list of demmands. It is this SME market and the OTAs that service them that are taking the brunt of current airline initiatives. The rest will follow.
Before I conclude let me set out the distribution milestones again as I see them:
1) Airlines have mainly eradicated standard agency commission payments but have failed to stop override and incentive payments. Whilst not totally successful it has enabled them to target better those they want to reward to a greater and more productive effect.
2) Agents responded by passing their new costs to the corporations by changing their contracts to management/transaction fees. End result? Most agencies protected their income and some grew it by ensuring remaining income from the airlines stayed with them and not passed on within their client deals. Airlines were forced to reduce prices to compensate customers.
3) GDS/Airline negotiations became far more aggressive. When you look at what airlines have to pay them, even for passenger cancellations and suchlike it is hardly surprising. Some airlines started charging TMCs for certain bookings to gain compensation. TMCs passed these costs on to the corporations but are still incentivised by GDSs which make airlines pretty mad as it is their fees that are funding them.
4) Various airlines changed some of the remaining IATA regulations regarding payment to shorten credit terms with TMCs and escalate penalties for perceived non compliance. A very much hidden cost that again the customer ended up collecting.I find it quite alarming how much cost comes into the chain via IATA and its interpretation of their own rules.
5) Credit/charge card usage has increased because of 4) as individual countries cut agency credit by 50% or more meaning TMC passed on the casflow deterioration to customers resulting in this migration to plastic . Ironic really as this area is very much a top target for airline cost reduction. Cards, like GDS charge wide and varying merchant fees to suppliers and these will be attacked robustly and very soon.
Where will this evolution take us? Airlines will continue fighting distribution costs. Instead of taking them all and then charging travellers through price they will try to dump them and leave the customer to pay separately. Meanwhile they will compensate by offering lower cost alternatives to those prepared to book direct. The battlefronts will be GDS fees, credit card merchant fees, cost of credit, TMC incentives and service deliverables. The customer will get what they say they want which is transparency and a unit price for everything. Currently I do not believe actual cost will go down. It will simply be realigned and will probably go up. If prices go down any further then there will be less suppliers, less choice and devolution not evolution.
It does not make sense that suppliers should pay for everything and then charge a correspondingly high price. Equally it does not make sense that the traveller gets all the bills and tries to negotiate their way out of them. I expect it is the way of the world and will provide yet newer business opportunities but regrettably the same old regurgitating costs.
It would take a book not a blog to go into the full detail and rationale so I will content myself and your patience by picking out the key players and change milestones in what will be a summary of what has happened and who are the movers and shakers. I think the customer needs to know the basics especially as they are ultimately paying unless they can do without at least one of the current cogs in the distribution mechanism.
Initially there was not much of an issue. The airlines worked in concert with each other and their supply chain and basically paid for everything required to distribute their product. They paid merchant fees to card companies, commission to agents (no such things as TMCs then) and fees to the GDS. Having picked up all these tabs they then sold their tickets with these costs built in to their fares. All of them did it so there was no problem Simple and reasonably effective in a well regulated, stable and growing travel market where little true competition existed.
As an example (and it varies hugely by area) airlines paid agents 10% commision and between 3 to 30% override, 1.5-3% card fees and 4% to 6% GDS charges.All of that bundled into the end ticket price.
Then things changed. Airlines expanded their route structures and became far more competitive with each other. The first sign of change was when ticket prices started to diversifyfrom airline to airline. In order to attract increasingly fickle travellers a fare differentiation was required. Carriers moved away from simply discounting their standardised global gross fare pricing and introduced corporate nets, yield managed specials and additional one-off deals.In one class alone you could end up with over a dozen fares each with their own restrictions and availability allocations.
The result was twofold. Firstly the ability to interchange tickets between airlines disappeared and secondly the need to mitigate pricing concessions made them look harder at their costs. Their distribution costs to be precise.
They found themselves in a real dilemma. The need to compete and discount was obviously threatening their profits (what there were) and simultaneously two other things happened. Low cost carriers with a totally different price model arrived who had to worry far less about convenience, timetables, airport locations and service which in turn encouraged corporations to view travel in a far more commoditised way. So, on one side they had to compete with carriers with a considerably lower cost base/tariff and on the other, a customer with a much harder stance towards price.
What became clear was that they could not continue paying the full cost of distributing their products whilst competing with new entrant pricing combined with more savvy buyers.Something had to give and what ‘gave’ was the air distribution model. After all, if you cannot beat the no frills airlines and professional buyers then the only option was to join them and challenge elsewhere in the travel merry-go- round.
I think their objectives were a mixture between the sound and the inevitable. The markets had clearly changed and if the end customer really wanted transparency and a lower cost model then give it to them. Whether they really wanted or needed it in the first place is a discussion for another day. Many of the arguments today are revolving around the desire for commoditisation coming head to head with the necessity for flexibility and uniformity of information and access.
There is another key influencing factor which is technology. Part of the reason why the main airlines feel both desirous and capable of change is that, for the first time there are other potential technology solutions out there. That is to say they are there if, and only if, the end users really do expect them to act individually rather than collectively with other provider’s inventory. Hence the current pressures on the GDS who provide all encompassing booking services and charge a high price for doing so. There is no way any individual airline can provide the diversity and product span that a GDS does.
The airlines (individually and at varying speeds) have called time on paying full distribution costs for all services to all customers. Unfortunately I do not see their goal as eradicating such costs. Their objective is to find what they see is the right home for these costs and then try to ensure the savings are not taken away by having to reduce prices to compensate the travellers, who will undoubtedly have to pay. Unless as I mentioned earlier a cog taken out of the distribution wheel. but which one?
So are there any expendable cogs? In some sectors of the market then probably yes. However, only if people recognise what they want and are prepared to accept the consequences and constraints of such. I think the line will be drawn between those corporations that want a controlled, managed and reported programme and others that choose a more deregulated approach where cheapest flights and few management ‘frills’ are acceptable.
If you want travel management you need knowledge and control. In order to do this you need someone to consolidate travel in all forms and package it into controllable chunks from as few sources as possible. At present this is best done through a GDS booking system, a travel management company and a mandated card programme. You take overall control of your travel, accept the price of doing so and form the right balance between value and all the other broader elements that complement your company ethos. Does anybody with a travel programme really want to run around numerous individual online airline sites and compare them when a GDS already does that in a one-stop environment?
On the other side if you want to maximise trip by trip savings there is no reason why approaching the cheapest distribution source and exploiting it until another one comes along is not the right way. To be frank the cheapest booking cost would be by going to an airline direct either independantly or through a TMC which is why carriers like American Airlines, Lufthansa etc are differentiating pricing and availability dependant on where the booking comes from. It does not by any means guarantee that overall trip price will be lower but the reservations element may be.
What I am begining to see happening is that airlines are finally differentiating between varying corporate needs and handling them individually. This part I applaud even though it has taken a long time and has a way to go. They are beginning to see the contrast between travel management and the very different service provided through Online Booking Agencies (OTAs) which, despite all the hype, focus on a different and smaller market that has a different list of demmands. It is this SME market and the OTAs that service them that are taking the brunt of current airline initiatives. The rest will follow.
Before I conclude let me set out the distribution milestones again as I see them:
1) Airlines have mainly eradicated standard agency commission payments but have failed to stop override and incentive payments. Whilst not totally successful it has enabled them to target better those they want to reward to a greater and more productive effect.
2) Agents responded by passing their new costs to the corporations by changing their contracts to management/transaction fees. End result? Most agencies protected their income and some grew it by ensuring remaining income from the airlines stayed with them and not passed on within their client deals. Airlines were forced to reduce prices to compensate customers.
3) GDS/Airline negotiations became far more aggressive. When you look at what airlines have to pay them, even for passenger cancellations and suchlike it is hardly surprising. Some airlines started charging TMCs for certain bookings to gain compensation. TMCs passed these costs on to the corporations but are still incentivised by GDSs which make airlines pretty mad as it is their fees that are funding them.
4) Various airlines changed some of the remaining IATA regulations regarding payment to shorten credit terms with TMCs and escalate penalties for perceived non compliance. A very much hidden cost that again the customer ended up collecting.I find it quite alarming how much cost comes into the chain via IATA and its interpretation of their own rules.
5) Credit/charge card usage has increased because of 4) as individual countries cut agency credit by 50% or more meaning TMC passed on the casflow deterioration to customers resulting in this migration to plastic . Ironic really as this area is very much a top target for airline cost reduction. Cards, like GDS charge wide and varying merchant fees to suppliers and these will be attacked robustly and very soon.
Where will this evolution take us? Airlines will continue fighting distribution costs. Instead of taking them all and then charging travellers through price they will try to dump them and leave the customer to pay separately. Meanwhile they will compensate by offering lower cost alternatives to those prepared to book direct. The battlefronts will be GDS fees, credit card merchant fees, cost of credit, TMC incentives and service deliverables. The customer will get what they say they want which is transparency and a unit price for everything. Currently I do not believe actual cost will go down. It will simply be realigned and will probably go up. If prices go down any further then there will be less suppliers, less choice and devolution not evolution.
It does not make sense that suppliers should pay for everything and then charge a correspondingly high price. Equally it does not make sense that the traveller gets all the bills and tries to negotiate their way out of them. I expect it is the way of the world and will provide yet newer business opportunities but regrettably the same old regurgitating costs.
Sabtu, 26 Juni 2010
A different approach to TMC negotiations?
I think one of the most disappointing outcomes from contract negotiation is that between corporations and TMCs. You can practically guarantee that one side or the other, or in time both, are not enamoured with the end results. The corporation wants total priority and service delivery at the lowest unit price whilst the TMC spends its time trying to figure out how to comply whilst clawing back profitability elsewhere in the deal or through caveats.
Another disappointment is that many of these negotiations are so combative. It is almost like trying to play a game of poker where the TMC has to play with his cards face up and the corporation with theirs to their chest. How can you get a good result when the beginning is riddled with various levels of speculation and possibly deceit? There really must be a better way.
I would really like to see such methodology turned 180 degrees. The RFP should be changed to an IFB (information for bidders). This IFB would say ‘look, this is what we think we really want’ and ‘here is a list of the important things in priority. Can you think of anything you could add to improve our service and savings? Here are the problems we currently have and how can you help resolve them’. The corporation would then receive an inflow of pertinent and creative ideas rather than getting a load of bland ‘comply/not comply’ answers to a bunch of sometimes irrelevant questions.
Having narrowed the field down to those TMC that have shown the right level of flair and innovation one could then move on to what they are hoping to achieve from winning the contract in both money terms and ongoing partnership. This would be much better than dragging in a TMC that has been cut to the bone and is frankly going to favour the client that brings more revenue and longevity.
Having now discovered what both parties want it is time to sit down together and thrash out how both can be achieved with as little compromise as possible. I can think of lots of ways to doing this in a way that protects commits and rewards.
Otherwise I guess people can continue what they are doing now. Issuing an RFP the size of a small book to TMCs who will be initially judged on how they answer a bunch of questions that really do not address the real issues. After all, the large TMCs can answer the questions any way they think you want to hear them and are probably already handing numerous Fortune 500 companies who asked the same.
So there we have it. Naïve? Workable? Or both?
Your guess is as good as mine!
Another disappointment is that many of these negotiations are so combative. It is almost like trying to play a game of poker where the TMC has to play with his cards face up and the corporation with theirs to their chest. How can you get a good result when the beginning is riddled with various levels of speculation and possibly deceit? There really must be a better way.
I would really like to see such methodology turned 180 degrees. The RFP should be changed to an IFB (information for bidders). This IFB would say ‘look, this is what we think we really want’ and ‘here is a list of the important things in priority. Can you think of anything you could add to improve our service and savings? Here are the problems we currently have and how can you help resolve them’. The corporation would then receive an inflow of pertinent and creative ideas rather than getting a load of bland ‘comply/not comply’ answers to a bunch of sometimes irrelevant questions.
Having narrowed the field down to those TMC that have shown the right level of flair and innovation one could then move on to what they are hoping to achieve from winning the contract in both money terms and ongoing partnership. This would be much better than dragging in a TMC that has been cut to the bone and is frankly going to favour the client that brings more revenue and longevity.
Having now discovered what both parties want it is time to sit down together and thrash out how both can be achieved with as little compromise as possible. I can think of lots of ways to doing this in a way that protects commits and rewards.
Otherwise I guess people can continue what they are doing now. Issuing an RFP the size of a small book to TMCs who will be initially judged on how they answer a bunch of questions that really do not address the real issues. After all, the large TMCs can answer the questions any way they think you want to hear them and are probably already handing numerous Fortune 500 companies who asked the same.
So there we have it. Naïve? Workable? Or both?
Your guess is as good as mine!
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